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Article 105 (1) lays down that:
" In order to facilitate the attainment of
the objectives stated in Article 104, Mem-
ber States shall co-ordinate their economic
policies. They shall for this purpose pro-
vide for collaboration between their appro-
priate administrative departments and be-
tween their Central Banks.
The Commission shall submit to the Coun-
cil recommendations on how such colla-
boration should be achieved. "
2. The Commission has so far abstained
from submitting to the Council, as required
by paragraph 2- of Article 105 (1), formal
recommendations on how collaboration be-
tween administrative departments and Cen-
tral Banks shall be achieved. During the
first stage of the transition period such a
step did not yet appear to be necessary.
In the exceptionally favourable general
economic conditions that existed, the col-
laboration which developed pragmatically
both in the Monetary Committee and at in-
formal meetings between the Ministers of
Finance and the Governors of the Central
Banks, was quite sufficient for the needs of
this period.
3. However, the first stage of integration
led only to a partial elimination of all that
restricted and hampered economic relations
between Member States. The elaboration
of common policies in the various fields was
also in a more or less early stage. In this
first stage, integration in the Common
Market did not playa particularly decisivp-
role in deciding how the monetary situation
developed or, consequently, in the monetary
policy pursued in the Member States. In
future, however, its role will become in-
creasingly important. Integration will de-
pend even more than in the past on mone-
tary developments in the Member States,
while these developments will themselves
be determined in large measure by inte-
gration as economic relations are freed
from restrictions and common policies intro-
duced in certain important fields, common
rules applied in others.
4. This growing interdependence between
national monetary policies and integration
in the Common Market means that all con-
cerned must co-operate more and more
closely in monetary matters. The progress
of integration would be endangered if the
monetary policy of one Member State were
to deviate in basic principles and broad
outlines from that pursued by the other
members. Every advance towards complete
freedom of economic relations between
Member States reduces the possibility 
maintaining such a divergent monetary
policy. The movement of goods and money
would be so distorted that the State con-cemed would have to alter its monetary
policy or else accept responsibility. for
endangering the existence of the Common
Market.
5. The co-ordination that is necessary 
the aims of the Treaty are to be realized
must apply not only to the basic principles
and broad outlines of monetary policy, but
also, as the obstacles hampering economic
relations are eliminated, to the more impor-
tant measures taken in the monetary field.
The existence of great differences in the
methods and instruments used to apply 
policy that in its broad lines is quite effec~
tively co-ordinated could, as the interde-
pendence of national economies develops,
lead to situations which would make it
difficult to eliminate restrictions or to main-
tain the freedom of economic relations,
especially with regard to movements of
capitaL It is therefore in the common
interest that Member States should keep
each other informed as early as possible of
their intentions in this field and should
examine together the possible repercussions
in the Common Market of the more impor-
tant measures contemplated.
6. Monetary co-operation cannot be limit~
ed to the action of the Central Banks alone;
it must also be extended to the action of the
authorities responsible for financial policy.
Public budgets, and the economic policy
decisions which they reflect, exercise on
monetary developments an influence com-
parable with and sometimes even more de-
cisive than that of the Central Banks.
Today, a large proportion of national in-
come passes through the public coffers.
The surpluses or deficits - in the public budg-
ets, and the method of financing any
deficits, inevitably exercise a determining
influence on the evolution of internal liqui-
dity and the monetary situation asa whole.
The effectiveness of monetary policy in the
broad sense therefore depends on Central
Bank policy and budgetary policy being co-
ordinated both in each Member State and
at Community leveL
7. Close co-ordination between the Mem-
ber States is also necessary in their inter-
national monetary relations, for this con-
stitutes the natural prolongation of co-or-
dination at home. This is especially true
of policy regarding exchange rates. The
effect of changes in these rates on inter-
national price and cost relations is direct,
and their repercussions on the functioning
of the Common Market might be of the
greatest importance. This applies also to
the case of a Member State having, because
-:y
of a deficit in its balance of payments, to
seek international assistance in the shape,
for instance, of recourse to the International
Monetary Fund. It would be in the com-
mon interest of the Member States that they
should examine what should be the nature
and scale of the support as well as the
conditions on which it was offered.
More generally the Member States, as par-
ties to the international monetary system
are themselves dependent on the functioning
of that system, for which they in any case
carry an increasing share of the responsibil-
ity. The manner in which the system
operates is of cardinal importance for the
maintenance of orderly monetary relations
between countries; at the same time it Can
have considerable repercussions on the
spread of inflationary or deflationary pres-
sures within the Common Market itself.
This means that the attitude of the Mem-
ber States in international monetary matters
must also be co-ordinated.
It is evident from the foregoing that Mem-
ber States should take major decisions in
international monetary matters only after
prior consultation.
8. In view of the progress already made
with integration and of the further steps to
be taken during the second stage, the Com-
mission is convinced of the need to ensure
the closest co-operation between the govern-
mental authorities responsible for monetary
and financial policy, and also between Cen-
tral Banks. In the attached documents, the
Commission has submitted to the Council
recommendations under paragraph 2 of Ar-
ticle 105 (1) of the Treaty which would
establish such co-operation by means of
systematic consultation prior to any impor-
tant decision relating to Central Bank, fi-
nance or foreign exchange policy.
In making these recommendations the Com-
missions has drawn on the experience gained
in the co-operation that has developed prag-
matically in the Monetary - Committee and
the informal meetings of the Ministers of
Finance and the Governors of the Central
Banks  experience which shows the need
for such co-operation.
9. The close collaboration evolved in Cen-
tral Bank, finance and foreign exchange
policy must form a coherent whole with
policy on current economic developments.
According to Article 145 of the Treaty,
the Council must ensure the co-ordination
of the general economic policies of the
Member States. This could be done in thecourse of a debate on general economic
policy that could be held early each year
in the Council. This debate could be
based on material submitted by the Mone-
tary Committee, the Economic Policy Com-
mittee and a Budget Policy Committee, the
creation of which is among the Commis- 
sion s recommendations to the Council un~
der Article 105 (1). As the discussions
would cover matters falling within the pro~
vince both of the Governments and of the
Central Banks, the Ministers of Finance, the
Ministers for Economic Mfairs and the
Governors of the Central Banks would all
have to take part.
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission
suggests that the Council should meet, if
possible, in January every year to discuss
the general economic policies of the Mem-
ber States, and that the meeting should be
attended by the Ministers of Finance, the
Ministers for Economic Affairs and the
Governors of the Central Banks.
RECOMMENDATION BY THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL CONCERNING
COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE CENTRAL BANKS AND THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
The collaboration provided for under Arti-
cle 105 (1) as regards Central Banks has
already been initiated both within the Mon-
etary Committee and in the ' course of
informal meetings between the Governors.
It consisted at first of regular and extensive
exchanges of views concerning the reasons
that had led to changes in policy by the
various banks of issue, together with the
effects of such changes. Moreover, it en-
abled systematic comparisons to be made
between the instruments of monetary policy
utilized in the countries of the European
Economic Community, to form a better
judgment of their advantages and disad-
vantages, and to make the criteria for their
utilization more homogeneous.
It is important now, at the present stage
of fruition of the Common Market, that
the highest financial authorities of the EEC
countries should be able to obtain infor-
mation direct and in good time of any
circumstances liable to call for changes in
the monetary policy of individual Member
States, and that they should consult each
other as to the extent of such changes and
of any repercussions these might. have on
their partners.
It is therefore advisable that a consultative
" Committee of Governors of Central
Banks in the European Economic Com-
munity ", be set up, providing these author-
ities with regular opportunities for joint
discussions and enabling them to contribute
more effectively towards the harmonious
working of the Common Market.
The main functions of this Committee of
Governors of Central Banks would be:
To watch monetary developments in each
of the Member States (to this end, the
opinions addressed by the Monetary Com-
mittee to the Council and to the Commis-
sion on this subject would be placed at its
disposal).
To hold consultations on the general prin-
ciples and broad outlines of Central Bank
policies, particularly in regard to credit, the
money market and the foreign exchange
market.
To exchange information regularly concern-
ing the principal meaSures that come within
the province of the Central Banks, and to
study such measures. So far as circull1-
stances and the dates set for the adoption
of these measures allow, these studies will
be made before the relevant decisions are
taken by the national authorities concerned.
The members of the Committee, if unable
to attend a meeting, could be represented
by a member of the Board of their Bank.
It should be noted that there is no Central
Bank in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg,
and that agreements drawn up within the
framework of the Belgo-Luxembourg Eco-
nomic Union set up a monetary association
between Belgium and the Grand Duchy.
The Commission considers that as a general
rule one of its members should be present at meetings of the Committee. The
Chairman of the Monetary Committee
might also be invited to attend.
The Committee of Governors of Central
Banks would decide on the venue for meet-
ings. It would be desirable, however, formeetings to be held at least once a year at
the headquarters of the European Economic
Community.
The Commission should also be able to ask
the Committee to meet at short notice if it
feels that the need is urgent.
The Commission considers it unnecessary
to formulate other proposals regarding the
functioning of this Committee. The latter
would draw up its own rules of procedure
and make its own arrangements for secre-
tarial services.
For the foregoing reasons, and in pur~
suance of the Treaty, in particular Article
105 (1) thereof, the Commission recom-
mends that the Council set up a " Commit-
tee of Governors of Central Banks of the
European Economic Community " in ac-
cordance with the draft decision appended
to the present recommendation.
Draft decision by the Council concemmg co-operation between Central Banks
in the European Econonllc Conununity
The Council of the European Economic
Community,
Having regard to  the Treaty, and in partic-
ular Article 105 (1) thereof;
Having regard to  the recommendation of
the Commission dated 19 June 1963;
Considering  that the advance towards eco-
nomic union, and particularly the further
steps to be taken to eliminate obstacles to
free movement of goods and capital, and
the establishment of common policies in
important fields, must necessarily be ac-
companied by more extensive co-ordination
of Central Bank policies;
Considering  that a fundamental requirement
for economic union is stability in the ex-
change parities of the currencies of the
Member States and that consequently econo-
mic .and monetary policies are required that
will ensure such stability;
Considerrng  that it is necessary to ensure
close co-ordination of monetary policies be-
tween the Member States of the European
Economic Community, as stressed by the
Commission in its Memorandum on the
Action Programme of the Community for
the second stage and by the European Par-
liament in its resolution of 17 October
1962 relating to the co-ordination of mone-
tary policies;
Considering  t,hat, in order to strengthen
the co-operation provided for in the Article
referred"to above, it would be expedient that
there should in future be consultations be-
tween the Central Banks, which would pre-




In order to further co-operation between
the Central Banks of the Member States,
a " Committee of Governors of Central
Banks of the European Economic Commu-
nity " is hereby created.
Article 
The Committee shall be composed of the
Governors of the Central Banks of the
Member States. In the event of any mem-
ber being unable to attend a meeting he
may delegate another member of the Board
of his Bank to replace hiin.
As ageneral rule, the Commission shall be
invited to delegate one of its members to
attend meetings of the Committee. The
Chairman of the Monetary Committee may
also be invited; in the event of his being
J-mable to attend he shall be represented 
one of the two Vice-Chairmen of that
Committee.
Article 
The main functions of the " Committee of
Governors of Central Banks of the Euro-
pean Economic Community " shall be 
i) To watch monetary developments in
each of the Member States. To this end,
the opinions addressed by the Monetary
Committee to the Council and to the Com-
mission regarding such developments shall
be transmitted to the Committee under
reference;
ii) To hold consultations on the general
principles and broad lines of Central Bank
policies, particularly in regard to credit, theIn,oney market and the foreign exchange
market;
Hi) To exchange information regularly con-
cerning the principal measures falling within
the province of the Central Banks, and to
study such measures. So far as circum.
stances and the dates set for the adoption
of these measures allow, these studies will
be made before the relevant decisions are
taken by the national authorities concerned.
Article 
The Committee shall meet at regular inter~
vals and whenever the situation makes a
meeting desirable. Should the Commission
consider that the need is urgent, it may
ask the Committee to meet at short notice.
The Committee itself shall decide on the
place where it shall meet. However, it
shall meet at least once a year at the. head-
quarters of the European Economic Com-
munity.
Article 
The Committe shall draw up its own rules
of procedure and organize its own secre-
tarial services.
RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL
CONCERNING CO~OPERATION BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES
IN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RELATIONS
The Member States of the Community play
an important part in the functioning of the
international monetary system, which may
profoundly .affect the movement towards
European economic unification. This is
particularly true of changes in exchange
rates. Hence the necessity for the Mem-
ber States to co-ordinate closely their poli-
cies in regard to international monetary
relations.
To this end, it is essential to institute within
the European Economic Community arran-
gements for consultation before any im-
portant decisions are taken by Member
States in this field and, generally speaking,
before any decision of these States regarding
the broad lines of international monetary
policy.
In each country, policy in this matter is
conducted by co-operation between govern-
ment authorities and the Central Banks.
Consultations in the European Economic
Community should therefore take place
through a body in which these institutions
are represented. The Monetary Committee
is in fact so composed. The discussion
of international monetary problems already
forms a large part of its activities. It would
therefore suffice to strengthen this form of
co-operation by referring more specific
points to this Committee.
The principal fields in which arrangements
should be made for regular consultations
in the monetary Committee are the fol-
lowing: 
i) General functioning of the international
monetary system;
ii) Recourse by Member States to the Inter-
national Monetary Fund;
iii) Participation by one or more of the
Member States in large-scale financial
assistance to another country, either directly
or through international organizations.
Preliminary consultations within the Com-
munity are also necessary in the event of
changes in the exchange parity of the cur-
rency of one or more of the Member Sta-
tes. Such consultations have been provided
for within the framework of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund by virtue of Article
IV(5) of its Statutes, but for various reasons
they do not meet the requirements of the
close co-ordination which is imperative
between the Member States .of the Eu-
ropean Economic Community in this mat-
ter. As economic relations between the
Common Market countries grow closer,
movements in the exchange parity of a
Member State s currency will have more
direct and more important consequences for
the other Member States than for other
countries. The fourth annual report of the
Monetary Committee, recalling the two
currency revaluations that took place 
March 1961 in the Community, said that
although this problem had on several occa-
sions been studied by the Monetary Com-
mittee, at the time the final decisions were
made these changes in parity had not been
preceded by adequate co-ordination at Com-
munity level.
Moreover, the introduction of common poli-
cies in various important sectors of the
economy has lent substance to the principleset forth in Article 107(1)  that each
Member State shall treat its policy with
regard to exchange rates as a matter of
common interest. The functioning of
various mechanisms for fixing prices and
tariffs which are necessary in order to give
effect to a common policy, particularly in
agriculture and transport, can be seriously
affected by changes in parity between Mem~
ber States' currencies.
Consequently, it would seem that the prin-
ciple of consultation before any alternation
of exchange parity between Member States
of the European Economic Community
must be accepted, whether such changes are
made by a Member State because of special
difficulties or are caused by disturbances
affecting the currency of one or more
countries, partcularly those which are wide-
ly used for international payments.
The establishment of procedures for prior
consultations on these matters presents com-
plex problems, especially having regard to
the requirements of secrecy and prompt
action. It is therefore recommended that
the Monetary Committee as the best qual-
ified body in this respect in the European
Community should be asked to consider
appropriate procedure to make these con-
sultations fully effective and report to the
Council and Commission. The Commission
will then make detailed proposals to the
Council.
For the foregoing reasons, and in pursuance
of the Treaty, more especially Article 105
thereof, the Commission makes the follow-
ing recommendations to the Council.
a)  To modify Article 1 of the statute of
the Monetary Committee as proposed in
the first draft decision below, so as 
empower it to arrange where necessary for
consultations before any major decision is
taken or attitude adopted by any Member
State in the field of international monetary
and financial relations, particularly as con-
cerns :
i) The general functioning of the inter-
national monetary system;
ii) Recourse by Member States to the
International Monetary Fund;
iii) Participation by one or more of the
Member States in large-scale financial
assistance to another country, either directly
or through international organizations.
b)  To decide, in accordance with the second
proposal below, that the Member States
must consult each other before any change
in the parity of their currency; to ask the
Monetary Committee to give its opinion as
to how such consultations could be organ-
ized; and to invite the Commission, in the
light of such opinion, to make precise pro-
posals to the Council concerning procedure
for the consultations in question.
Draft decision of the Council relating to co-operation between Member States
in regard to international monetary relations
The Council of the European Economic
Community,
Having regard to  the Treaty, and in partic-
ular Articles 105, 116 and  153  thereof;
Having regard to  the recommendation of
the Commission, dated 19 June 1963;
Whereas  the functioning of the international
monetary system can profoundly affect the
movement towards the economic unification
of Europe;
Whereas  in the event of one of the Member
States having a balance-of-payments deficit
it would be in the common interest to con-
sider how such deficit may be covered and,
in particular, whether recourse should be
had for this purpose to the International
Monetary Fund;
Whereas  close co-ordination is necessary
between the policies  of  Member States re-
garding international monetary relations, as
urged by the Commission in its Memoran.
dum on the Community s Action Program.
me for the second stage and by the Euro-
pean Parliament in its Resolution of 17 Oct-
ober 1962 concerning the co-ordination of
monetary policies in the European Econo.
mic Community;
Whereas  the most appropriate method of
ensuring such co-ordination is to hold the
necessary consultations in the Monetary
Committee,
decides,
Article 1 of the Monetary Committee s sta-
tutes shall be modified as follows:~, The Committee shall keep under review
the monetary and financial situation of the
'Member States and of the Community,
,together with the general payments position
of the Member States, and shall report reg-
ularly to the Council and to the Com-
:missions thereon.
Consultation shall take place witq.in the
Monetary Committee prior to any major
decision taken or attitude adopted by the
Member States in the field of international
monetary relations, particularly as con-
cerns :
i) The general functioning of the inter-
national monetary system;
ii) Recourse by Member States to the
International Monetary Fund;
iii) Participation by one or more of the
Member States in large-scale financial assist-
ance to another country, either directly by
the national monetary authorities or through
international organizations
Draft decision of the Council relating to prior consultations between Member States
in the event of changes in the parity of their currencies
The Council of the European Economic
Community,
Having regard to  the Treaty, and in partic-
ular Articles 105, 107 and 152 thereof;
Having regard  to the recommendation of
the Commission dated 19 June 1962;
Whereas  changes in the parity of one or
more currencies of member countries of the
European Economic Community may have
far-reaching effects upon the functioning
of the Common Market;
Whereas  close co-ordination is necessary
between the policies of Member States re-
garding international monetary relations in
general and exchange rates in particular
as urged by the Commission in its Memo-
randum on the Community s Action Pro-
gramme for the second stage and by the
European Parliament in its Resolution of
17 October 1962 relating to the co-ordina-




There shall be consultation between Mem-
ber States before any change is made in the
parity of their currency.
Article 
The Monetary Committee shall be invited
to express its opinion as to the procedure to
be established for prior consultations in
the event of any change being made in the
parity of the currency of one or more of
the Member States, and to report to the
Council and to the Comr.1ission.
Article 
The Commission shall be invited to make
proposals to the Council concerning the said
procedure in the light of the opinion ren-
dered by the Monetary Committee.
RECOMMENDATION BY THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL CONCERNING
CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE COMPETENT GOVERNMENT DEP ARTMENTS
OF MEMBER STATES IN MATIERS OF BUDGETARY POLICY
The co-ordination of monetary policies
would be incomplete if it were to be con-
fined to purely monetary matters and took
no account of government decisions in the
field of public finance. Such co-ordination
presupposes that the budgetary policy of
individual Member States does not com-
promise the joint conduct of monetary poli-
cies. The same applies with regard to the
effects of budgetary policy on general eco-
nomic development. It is therefore neces-
sary that the broad lines of budgetary poli-
cy be discussed within the Community be~
fore they are settled by each Member
State.
This should be done in the more general
context of overall economic forecasts, in
the form of " economic budgets . These
economic budgets are now drawn up everyyear for the following year, on as far as
possible a uniform plan, and are to be grad-
ually consolidated in an economic budget
of the Community. In any event, the pre~
paration of these economic budgets involves
taking into account national budget trans-
actions, by very reason of their repercus~
sions on economic development.
It therefore seems advisable that the con~
frontation of economic budgets should in-
clude a confrontation of national budgets.
This should apply to estimates of total
revenue and expenditure together with the
breakdown into headings having the most
significance as regards economic trends
It would suffice for this breakdown to show
on the one hand, the proportion of total
revenue from different categories of taxes
direct and indirect  and, on the other
hand, the distribution of total expenditure
between government departments, transfer
incomes, capital subsidies, investment by
government departments themselves and,
finally, loans and advances. This work
could be done by a' committee composed of
senior officials from the Ministries of Fi-
nance competent in matters of budgetary
policy; it should proceed in close co-ordi-
nation and concurrently with the work rela~
ting to the preparation of economic. fore-
casts.
From the preliminary stage in drawing up
national budgets there should be exchanges
of views in this Committee on the broad
lines of the budgetary policies of the Mem-
ber States, particularly from the angle of
their repercussions on the economic deve-
lopment of the Community as a whole. 
addition, the work of the Budgetary Policy
Committee should go hand in hand with
that of the Monetary Committee and of the
Economic' Policy Committee, since it 
meant to provide these Committees with
the necessary material for discussion on the
specifically monetary and economic aspects
of the execution of national budgets.
For the foregoing reasons, in pursuance of
the Treaty and more especially Article
105(1) thereof, the Commission recommends
that the Council should set up a Budgetary
Policy Committee, as proposed in the draft
decision appended to the present recom-
mendation.
Draft decision of the Council concerning co-operation between the competent departments
of Member States' Governments in the sphere of budgetary policy
The Council of the European Economic
Community,
Having regard to  the Treaty, and particu-
larly Article 105(1) thereof;
Having regard to  the recommendation of
the Commission dated 19 June 1963;
Whereas  budgetary decisions have reper-
cussions on economic and monetary deve-
lopment; and whereas the co-ordination of
economic policies  particularly conjunct-
ural and monetary policies  would be
inadequate without co-ordination in budge-
tary policies;
Whereas  it is necessary to ensure close
co-ordination of conjunctural and monetary
policies and of budgetary and financial
policies of the Member States, as urged by
the Commission in its Memorandum on the
Action Programme of the Community for
the second stage and by the European Par-
liament in its resolutions of 17 October
1962 relating to co-ordination of monetary,
budgetary and financial policies in the Eu-
ropean Economic Community;
Whereas  to this end it is desirable to organ-
ize such co-operation within a group com-
posed of representatives of the Govern-
ments and of the Commission
decides,
Article 
There shall be set up a Bud!.Cetary Policy
Committee. The task of thi~ Committee
shall be to study, when national budgets
are at an early stage of pref,aration, the
broad lines of Member States' budgetary
policies, particularly from the point of
view of their repercussions on the economic
development of the Community as a whole,
and to make a confrontation of these
budgets.
Article 
The Committee shall be composed of re-
presentatives of the Member States and of the Commission, each of which shall
appoint a full member and an alternate.
Article 
The Commission shall co-ordinate and
synchronize the work of this Committee
with that of the Monetary Committee and
of the Economic Policy Committee.
Article 
The Budgetary Policy Committee shall draw
up its own rules of procedure. Its secreta-
rial services shall be provided by the Com-
mission.